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‘What Makes a Market Economy? 
Schumpeter, Smith and Walras on the Coordination Problem’ 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The tradition of modern political economy is founded upon attempts to show how a 
market economy of autonomous individuals can function smoothly in the absence of a 
central authority to coordinate economic activity.  This has become known, for obvious 
reasons, as the coordination problem.  As suggested by the title of this article, to confront 
the coordination problem is to focus upon the question, ‘what makes a market 
economy?’.  In the pages that follow, I argue that the answer to such a question lies not, 
as we might expect, in the realm of economics, but in that of moral philosophy.  In order 
to sustain this argument, I revisit debates about the essence of the market economy which 
are to be found in the history of economic thought literature, but which are almost 
entirely ignored by modern economists. 
 
A broad reading of the history of economic thought literature throws up some important 
findings.  For a start, it shows that no successful attempt has ever been made to resolve 
the coordination problem at the level of pure economics.  Indeed, by careful 
consideration of the most celebrated of such attempts – that undertaken by Léon Walras 
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over successive editions of his Eléments d'Économie Politique Pure – we might well be 
drawn to the conclusion that the coordination problem is fundamentally irresolvable at 
that level.  The question, ‘what makes a market economy?’, may therefore not be an 
economic question at all. 
 
If this is true, then important public policy implications follow.  Perhaps most 
profoundly, there can be no purely economic justification for establishing institutions that 
are designed specifically to introduce market relations into social life: at least, not that 
can be captured in the standard demand and supply diagrams of textbook economics.1
 
  It 
is common fare for political economists to assert that market institutions have politically 
regulating effects on social life.  However, this tends to be countered by the 
acknowledgement that such effects are intimately tied to economic relations that can be 
justified in their own terms: i.e., as a precursor to increased economic dynamism and 
increased economic efficiency.  The debate about market relations takes on a completely 
different dimension if it can be shown that these secondary claims lack substance and, in 
fact, there is no purely economic justification for incorporating individuals into market 
relations.  In such circumstances, the question of establishing market institutions becomes 
a purely political question. 
In order to arrive at this conclusion, I draw upon the work of the two most important 
economic theorists to have attempted to resolve the coordination problem.  One, as 
previously alluded to, is Léon Walras, and the other is Adam Smith.  The analyses of the 
two men differ in one important respect.  Walras’s attempted resolution of the 
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coordination problem is situated at the level of pure economics and, in this way, he asks 
the question, ‘what makes a market economy?’, only after having already assumed that a 
market economy exists.  He takes the presence of market institutions as a given, and only 
then does he begin to explore how a market economy of autonomous individuals derives 
its stability in the absence of a central authority to coordinate economic activity. 
 
For Smith, by contrast, the coordination problem must be resolved before market 
institutions are introduced as a regulatory mechanism for social life.  He attempts to 
specify the conditions under which we can expect a smoothly functioning economy to 
result from the incorporation of individuals into a system of market relations.  As such, 
he asks the question, ‘what makes a market economy?’, without having made the prior 
assumption that a market economy already exists.  The conditions under which market 
institutions will prove operable are not economic conditions at all, but relate to the 
constitution of the individual as a moral being.  For Smith, then, the resolution of the 
coordination problem takes place at the level of moral philosophy. 
 
The very possibility that this might be the case tends to be lost within modern 
reinterpretations of the history of economic thought.  The modern tendency is to cleanse 
political economy of its preoccupation with questions of moral philosophy, in order to 
create a discipline of pure economics.  Looking specifically at the coordination problem, 
Joseph Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis represents the seminal work of this 
nature.  In section one of what follows, I show how Schumpeter reduces the coordination 
problem to the level of pure economics by redrawing the intellectual lineage between 
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Smith and Walras, such that Smith is consciously re-positioned as a proto-Walrasian.  In 
so doing, Smith’s own attempt to treat the coordination problem as a matter of moral 
philosophy is, in effect, written out of the history of economic thought for not being 
sufficiently ‘economic’ in its explanatory content.  In section two I restate Smith’s 
original position on the coordination problem, and in section three I contrast this with 
Walras’s avowedly economic writings on the same theme.  In the final section, I discuss 
the implications of Walras’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to resolve the coordination 
problem at the level of pure economics.  It is here that I explore the possibility that there 
are no purely economic justifications for establishing institutions with the sole intention 
of incorporating individuals into market relations. 
 
 
 
 
Schumpeter and a Walrasian Reading of Smith 
 
Joseph Schumpeter sets the tone for the modern understanding of Adam Smith’s 
contribution to the history of economic thought in his magisterial overview of the canon, 
History of Economic Analysis.2  Schumpeter himself was schooled in the Walrasian 
tradition, and he reduces Smith’s contribution to momentary flashes of inspiration which, 
with hindsight, can be read as a forerunner of what we today understand as Walrasian 
themes.  Schumpeter is by no means alone in this general endeavour.  Smith’s work has 
been subjected to any number of attempts at creative ‘reading in’, whereby modern 
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political economists from different theoretical backgrounds have all supposedly shown 
that the history of economic thought runs in a linear fashion from past to present, leading 
directly from Smith to themselves.  As Jacob Viner observed in an essay written to mark 
the 150th anniversary of the publication of The Wealth of Nations, “Traces of every 
conceivable sort of doctrine are to be found in that most catholic book, and an economist 
must have peculiar theories indeed who cannot quote from The Wealth of Nations to 
support his special purposes”.3
 
 
However, if Schumpeter is in good company in attempting to read into The Wealth of 
Nations what he wants to read into it, his was a novel attempt to read Smith specifically 
as a Walrasian.  In Schumpeter’s hands, Smith’s contribution is merely to identify the 
broad outlines of the intellectual puzzles that Walras subsequently creates the analytical 
tools to solve.  Schumpeter’s aim is to reconstruct the history of economic thought, such 
that intellectual progress within the discipline is measured solely in terms of the extent to 
which it develops as a science that is indisputably Walrasian in its underlying conception.  
Set within such a context, the only contribution that Smith can make to the history of 
economic thought is in those moments in which his thoughts can subsequently be re-
presented with the imprint of Walrasian themes.  Schumpeter portrays the whole of pre-
Walrasian theory in terms of the help it provides for Walras to specify the central 
problem of economic analysis as a problem of pure economics: that of how decentralised 
markets coordinate individual economic activities. 
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Content to judge him solely on such grounds, Schumpeter argues that the only aspect of 
Smith’s thought that deserves to be of interest for modern-day economists is Chapter VII 
of Book One of The Wealth of Nations.  In that chapter, Smith outlines his famous 
distinction between market prices and natural prices.  Market prices are those that have to 
be paid to execute the everyday process of exchange.  Natural prices, by contrast, are 
those that reflect the true value of the good being exchanged, as determined by the cost of 
factor inputs alone.  Schumpeter focuses on Smith’s view of the relationship between 
market prices and natural prices and, in particular, on one phrase that Smith uses to 
capture the essence of that relationship.  Smith argues that, all other things being equal, 
the natural price is that to which market prices are “continuously gravitating”.4
 
 
Schumpeter reads into the suggestion of an implicit mechanism that will enforce 
convergence between market and natural prices what he calls a “rudimentary equilibrium 
theory”.5  However, the concept of ‘equilibrium’, despite being a common part of 
economic discourse in the 1770s, is almost entirely overlooked by Smith.6
 
  It appears 
only once in the whole of The Wealth of Nations.  Schumpeter’s depiction of Smith as a 
‘rudimentary equilibrium theorist’ is therefore to assign a meaning to Smith’s work that, 
in all likelihood, Smith himself was consciously trying to avoid. 
Moreover, that meaning itself relies upon the important intervention of an intermediary.  
Schumpeter suggests that Smith’s contribution to the history of economic thought rests 
on the influence that Chapter VII of Book One of The Wealth of Nations had on Walras’s 
thought, even though Walras himself draws upon Say’s re-working of Smith’s Chapter 
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VII, rather than Smith’s original.7  In Donald Winch’s ironic précis of Schumpeter’s 
position, Chapter VII was only “a good chapter because it enabled Jean-Baptiste Say to 
write a better one that was, in turn, to prove an inspiration to Léon Walras”.8
 
 
Modern-day economists have found much intellectual comfort in Schumpeter’s rather 
crude dismissal of Smith’s overall contribution to the history of economic thought.  For a 
start, it reduces economics to the study of simple equilibrium states, removing from the 
analysis any need to empirically verify actually existing economic conditions, in favour 
of stipulating logical propositions.  As Nicholas Kaldor suggests in his seminal article, 
‘The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics’, equilibrium economics is mathematical 
economics.  The latter, in turn, rests solely on the elucidation of basic assumptions which, 
while refined as a study of pure logic, takes the economic content of the analysis no 
further than the starting point of the initial assumptions.9
 
 
Second, Schumpeter’s attempt to downplay Smith’s contribution to the history of 
economic thought allows modern-day economists to undertake their endeavour without 
regard to Smith’s wider writings.  Schumpeter is dismissive not only of the analysis 
contained within The Wealth of Nations, but of the whole tradition of political economy 
that Smith represented.  He insists that “the garb of philosophy is removable … in the 
case of economics”.10
 
  By contrast, Smith’s work was rooted in moral philosophy and his 
prior philosophical reflections are constitutive of his economic enquiry. 
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Smith’s aim was to understand the way in which different forms of economic life 
impacted upon, and threatened to subvert, the moral principles that underpinned a 
functioning society and a harmonious social life free from injustice.11  Such principles 
cannot be condensed into a simple model of equilibrium economics, nor can they be 
explained solely through the use of formal mathematical logic.  It is true that Smith 
invoked a gravitational mechanism to describe the relationship between market and 
natural prices, as it is true that a gravitational mechanism is amenable to study using 
mathematical methods.  Yet, he also suggests, as an addendum to the passage in which he 
appealed to the image of a gravitational mechanism, that “different accidents may 
sometimes keep [market prices] suspended a good deal above [the natural price], and 
sometimes force them down even somewhat below it”.12
 
  As a consequence, and unlike 
the gravitational mechanism that arises in the natural world, there is no automatic trigger 
for the gravitational mechanism in Smith’s economic world.  The intervening influence 
of his ‘accidents’ confirm as much. 
Such ‘accidents’ also appear in the first three editions of Walras’s Eléments d’Économies 
Politique Pure, in those moments in which Walras discusses trading at disequilibrium 
prices.  In Walras, however, Smith’s ‘accidents’ take a strictly economic form.  They 
result from economic agents misreading the signals emerging from the price system and, 
as a consequence, miscalculating their purely economic considerations of costs and 
benefits.  The same sort of purely economic calculation does not appear anywhere in 
Smith.  His concern is, in fact, precisely the opposite.  It is to demonstrate the 
indivisibility of political economy and moral philosophy.  As such, the economic effect, 
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that of the failure of market prices always to conform to the natural price, or what 
modern-day economists call the failure of the market’s equilibrating mechanism, cannot 
have a purely economic cause.  Therefore, the question of how decentralised markets 
coordinate individual economic activities through the price mechanism cannot be 
resolved solely at the economic level.  For Smith, the gap between market and natural 
prices has its origins in the moral basis of society.  The failure of market prices always to 
converge on the natural price represents a failure to socialise all individuals into the just 
principles that create a society devoid of harm.  If market prices are above the natural 
price, this is symptomatic of a commodity market in which goods are being sold above 
their true value.  In such circumstances, and Smith wrote at length in the later books of 
The Wealth of Nations about why we might experience such circumstances, producers are 
exercising power over consumers. 
 
From Smith’s perspective, such power is illegitimately exercised, in that it harms the 
consumers who have to pay in excess of the natural price.  A society that tolerates a price 
structure in which market and natural prices diverge is therefore a society that tolerates 
unjust relations at the inter-personal level.  As a consequence, it is also a society that 
lacks the instinct for propriety, which Smith believed to be at the core of equable 
communal relations.13
 
 
Despite what are clearly significant differences within the analytical systems of Smith 
and Walras, Schumpeter’s reading of the history of economic thought, which posits 
Smith as a proto-Walrasian, has been highly influential amongst the economics 
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profession.  Indeed, for a large proportion of modern-day economists, trained as they are 
in Walrasian general equilibrium theory, Schumpeter’s account of Smith’s contribution to 
the history of economic thought has become the way to read The Wealth of Nations.  It 
has also become the reason not to read his earlier Theory of Moral Sentiments.14  The 
result has been numerous attempts either to judge Smith on his failure to specify the basis 
of a fully worked out general equilibrium theory,15 or to selectively read the origins of 
general equilibrium theory back into Smith.16  Such attempts are almost entirely 
misguided.  According to Winch, they serve no useful purpose, for the simple reason 
“that Smith was not trying very hard to be a general equilibrium theorist”.  Any attempt 
to read strict Walrasian themes into Smith’s work therefore runs the risk of “sequential 
anachronisation”,17
 
 as Smith’s classical political economy concerns are made to fit the 
rather different concerns of modern-day economists.  Schumpeter’s herculean efforts to 
re-write the history of economic thought from a distinctively Walrasian perspective have 
acted as a Procrustean bed for Smithian political economy. 
In the following section, I attempt to reinstate Smith’s original position on the 
coordination problem.  Smith’s proposed resolution of the coordination problem focuses 
on the moral constitution of the individual economic agent.  He specifies a set of moral 
conditions under which, and only under which, a market economy of autonomous 
individuals can function smoothly in the absence of a central authority to coordinate 
economic activity.  Such conditions require for the development of the individual to have 
reached the level at which every member of society’s first moral instinct is to forego the 
self-interested alternative in order to ensure that others are treated with propriety.  In Part 
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VII of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith comes close to acknowledging that these 
conditions refer to an imagined utopia, rather than to a real-life possibility.  Immediately, 
then, we should be aware that a latent scepticism is evident in Smith in relation to the 
market economy. 
 
 
 
 
Solving the Coordination Problem through Moral Principles? Smith’s ‘Impartial 
Spectator’ 
 
For Smith, the key to understanding the unique nature of the human species is to be found 
in the capacity for imagination that human beings are able to display.18  To live life 
without imaginatively reconstructing the situation in which others find themselves is to 
fail to exercise our full human capacities.  According to Smith, we only become truly 
conscious of ourselves in those moments in which we are conscious of our relationships, 
both real and imagined, with other people.19
 
 
This must be contrasted with much modern economics that claims to be derived directly 
from Smith, in which the decision to act without concern for other people is the core 
principle of economic decision-making.  This was a view of economic agency that 
Walras was content to endorse.  Yet, for Smith, such a view is to deny the truly human 
element of the self.  To behave in a purely self-interested manner is to corrupt the moral 
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basis of the self that is called upon to act in such a way.  As a consequence, the economic 
agent that acts in a purely self-interested manner is not a truly human agent.  On the very 
first page of The Wealth of Nations, Smith makes the strikingly obvious point that all 
economic activity occurs within society.20  So long as this remains true, the pure self-
interest of Walrasian thought experiments cannot be the underlying motivation for 
economic activity.21  Neither, then, and contrary to so many modern interpretations of 
Smith,22
 
 can it be the means through which individual behaviour is coordinated, such that 
it coheres into a functioning market economy. 
The only way in which this could be so is if the market economy takes shape somehow 
beyond society.  This was not a possibility that Smith took seriously, though, because he 
was adamant both that the market economy was a human creation and that all human life 
occurs within the context of society.  In two passages from the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, Smith makes explicit reference to life lived in “some solitary state”, “without 
any communication with society”.  However, those references are prefixed by the 
clauses, “were it possible” and “if it was possible”, showing that he believed that living 
life alone was a purely hypothetical state of being.23  At any particular moment of time, 
an individual is involved in numerous relationships with other individuals within society.  
The key to maintaining those relationships is the mutual respect that arises from each 
member of society treating every other with propriety.  For Smith, the market economy 
has no essential features of its own.  It is merely an aggregation of the social relationships 
of which it is constituted.  The key to maintaining the market economy is therefore the 
same as that of maintaining its constituent parts.  In the absence of deeply ingrained 
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moral instincts for propriety, a smoothly functioning market economy is not a possibility.  
From a Smithian perspective, the introduction of market institutions can never be 
justified, unless it is within a context in which all economic agents are already fully 
socialised with the instinct for propriety. 
 
This, of course, is an exceptionally exacting standard.  Indeed, so exacting is it that Smith 
acknowledges that society might never reach the stage where it is populated by such 
pristine individuals.  The Theory of Moral Sentiments depicts two possible end-states for 
the individual.  One is the type of person we might become if we are able to subjugate all 
the selfish passions to the concern for acting with propriety.  The other is the type of 
person we might become if instead we follow the most basic acquisitive tenets of market 
society.  Contained within these two types of person we find a basic contradiction within 
market life. 
 
On the one hand, the market economy, with its spectacle of riches and its constant appeal 
to desires that might be satisfied, has a potentially corrupting influence on individuals 
who allow themselves to be enveloped by the alluring images and the limitless wants of 
the commercial way of life.  Without an obsessive admiration for wealth, which arises 
from the moral corruption of the individual and leads the corrupted individual to demand 
goods solely to satisfy the ‘deception’ of worthless desires,24 the market economy would 
be deprived of its vibrancy and its dynamism.  On the other hand, the automatic 
reproduction of a market society can only proceed following the constitution of 
uncorrupted individuals who act instinctively with propriety.  The coordination problem – 
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which, for Smith of course, is a problem of society not of the economy – has no 
resolution in the absence of such pristine individuals.  As such, there is a requirement for 
some form of central authority to impose the coordination structures that would otherwise 
be missing.  The contradiction of market life can therefore be easily stated: the moral 
character of the individuals who provide the market economy with its dynamism is itself 
an impediment to the automatic reproduction of market society. 
 
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith focuses on the latter part of this contradiction 
and, in particular, on how the pristine individual might emerge from the corruptible 
individual.  It is here that he places great significance on the human imagination.  He 
suggests that it is from our capacity for the imaginative reconstruction of the condition of 
others that we derive a sense of justice.25  This is important, because Smith believes that a 
society lacking an ethical code rooted in a sense of justice is a society that cannot 
function in any meaningful sense.26
 
 
It may well be a society which, on the surface, appears to permit flourishing forms of 
economic life.  However, below these surface appearances, this will be a society in which 
economic relations are systematically exploitative and in which the self-interested use of 
political power is necessary in order to reproduce such exploitative relations.  In the 
absence of just treatment of all individuals within the economy, Smith argues that a self-
reproducing market structure cannot be assured in the face of the incentives that 
merchants and manufacturers have to collude with one another in an attempt to exploit 
society as a whole.27  The coordination problem is only resolved in circumstances in 
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which the social relations of production are subjected to routine self-reproduction.  Yet, 
for Smith, this relies on the willingness and the ability of individuals both to internalise 
concerns for justice into their most basic elements of cognition and to embody those 
concerns in their everyday practices.28  In an often cited passage from the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, Smith writes that: “Justice is the main pillar that upholds the whole 
edifice.  If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society [including the 
market economy that is a feature of such a society] … must in a moment crumble into 
atoms”.29
 
 
For Smith, our sense of justice is a manifestation of our ability to experience what he 
moves between calling ‘sympathy’ and ‘fellow feeling’ for the needs of others.30
 
  Fellow 
feeling relies on the imaginative reconstruction of the social circumstances of other 
people.  The fact that we are able to imaginatively reconstruct the needs of others 
confirms that we will simultaneously have a means of anticipating the relative propriety 
of our actions.  Our actions are most likely to pass other people’s tests of propriety if they 
have first passed our own, especially in circumstances in which our own tests are based 
on the imaginative reconstruction of the form that other people’s tests will take.  It is our 
own imagination, then, that acts as a moral compass to guide our actions. 
For Smith, our imagination takes the form of an ‘impartial spectator’, and it is the 
impartial spectator that holds the key to the resolution of the coordination problem.  
According to Smith, we are answerable to the impartial spectator as our conscience.31  It 
is at the instigation of our conscience that we are able to sympathise with the condition of 
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others.  In effect, the impartial spectator exercises will over us, and it is through its 
exercise of will that we act in a manner that is appropriate to the emotions that our 
sympathies evoke.32
 
 
The impartial spectator is not only a part of the self, it is that part of the self that allows 
the individual to experience what it is to be truly human.  In the absence of situations in 
which it is possible to effect conscience, the life that Smith depicts for us is a solitary life 
in which we are never morally whole, because we have no active frames of reference 
against which to judge the propriety of our actions.  What, then, are we to make of a 
market economy that becomes a context for actions that are not prompted by the impartial 
spectator?  If we take Smith’s argument seriously, it will be an economy that imposes 
dehumanising effects upon those who operate within it.  In addition, so long as the 
market economy is populated by conscious human agents eager to assert themselves as 
autonomous moral beings, it will also be an economy that cannot experience routine self-
reproduction. 
 
The existence of market institutions appears to offer incentives for individuals to act in an 
increasingly self-interested manner.  Certainly, the reward structure embedded by market 
institutions provides enhanced levels of material well-being for those who act on the 
basis of instrumental rationality (i.e., doing what they want to do solely through concern 
for themselves).  By contrast, no such automatic increases in material well-being follow 
for those who act on the basis of deontological rationality (i.e., doing what they think 
they ought to do in the interests of society as a whole).33  If instrumental rationality is to 
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dominate deontological rationality, individuals have to disable the impartial spectator in 
order to ignore its promptings to act out of concern for others.  However, for Smith, the 
presence of a fully active and fully activated impartial spectator is a necessary 
precondition for the resolution of the coordination problem. 
 
Does this mean, then, that Smith believed the coordination problem to be fundamentally 
irresolvable in economies that are constructed on the basis of market institutions?  This is 
not a question to which he delivers a definitive answer, but it is certainly something that 
is implied by his work.  For Smith himself, the issue was not to assume the prior 
existence of market institutions as a prelude to asking whether such institutions created 
conditions that led automatically to the resolution of the coordination problem.  He asked 
instead about the type of economic agents that needed to be in existence if the 
coordination problem was to be resolved, and then he explored how such agents could be 
constituted as moral beings.  Insofar, though, as market institutions socialise individuals 
into self-interested patterns of behaviour, it is unlikely that they provide the context for 
instilling the deontological rationality that Smith believed to be at the heart of the 
resolution of the coordination problem. 
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Solving the Coordination Problem through Pure Economics? The Walrasian 
‘Auctioneer’ 
 
By the time that Walras was writing, most economists had dismissed Smith’s concerns, 
and ascribed purely self-interested character traits to their economic agents in order to 
construct economic problems that were mathematically tractable.  Walras worked within 
such a tradition and, for him, attempts to resolve the coordination problem as a series of 
algebraic equations could only proceed once the starting assumption of pure self-interest 
had already been made. 
 
Despite these significant differences in starting assumptions, however, Walras’s original 
concern is no less to derive a representation of a just economy than is Smith’s.34  
Walras’s models of the economy operate to the standard of ‘justice in exchange’, 
whereby distributional neutrality at the moment of exchange ensures that the distribution 
of endowments preceding exchange is retained after the exchange is complete.35  He is 
keen to stress that this standard renders his models purely hypothetical, as all instances of 
exchange have distributional consequences in the context of self-interested economic 
agents.36
 
  At no stage does he claim that his theoretical models are simple reflections of 
the exchange system as it occurs in practice. 
This does not mean, however, that he believed his theoretical models to be irrelevant to 
the study of real life.  The role they played was to state, in formal terms, the conditions 
that had to be in place if the criterion of justice in exchange was to be satisfied.  As Jan 
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Van Daal and Albert Jolink argue, Walras was hoping to do more than merely 
‘mathematicise’ the coordination problem by showing that the criterion of justice in 
exchange had a mathematical solution.37
 
  His adoption of the rigour of formal 
mathematical logic highlights a concern to provide universal benchmarks against which it 
is possible to decide whether the introduction of market institutions should be tolerated 
by society.  Walras begins his investigation of the coordination problem with social 
questions foremost in mind.  The pure economics of Les Eléments is merely a means of 
commenting on the encroachment of market institutions into social life and, in particular, 
a means of passing judgement on the acceptable limits of the subjugation of social 
existence to the market economy. 
The concept of ‘tâtonnement’ is central both to Walras’s pure economics and to his wider 
social concerns.  This is a word that has no direct translation from French to English but, 
as a concept, it is used to depict the process through which the price mechanism ‘gropes’ 
its way towards a structure of equilibrium prices.38
 
  This sense of groping has been the 
subject of intense discussion within the secondary literature, but most historians of 
economic thought agree that it is synonymous with the determination of prices.  Any 
resolution of the coordination problem requires that the condition of justice in exchange 
is met, which in turn requires that the determination of prices takes place in the absence 
of distributional consequences for the economy as a whole.  Given that prices are formed 
via groping, this means that it is the precise characteristics of the tâtonnement process 
that determine whether or not the coordination problem is resolved. 
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However, it is difficult to know exactly how to use Walras’s concept of tâtonnement to 
resolve the coordination problem, because we find that there are two distinct notions of 
tâtonnement in his work.  The Walras of the first three editions of Les Eléments 
conceptualises the process of tâtonnement within the context of a disequilibrium-
production model.  Here, it is prices that are subjected to the dynamics of groping.  Each 
time that production occurs at a level that is not optimal for the economy as a whole, 
exchange takes place at disequilibrium prices.  Equilibrium prices only arise over time, 
when producers learn more about optimum levels of output and, as a consequence, they 
engage in equilibrium production.  In such circumstances, the observed temporal trend in 
prices is that of successive attempts to get closer to the equilibrium price before finally 
arriving at it.  All this is an anathema, though, to the Walras of the fourth edition of Les 
Eléments, which is now generally regarded as his definitive statement.  In this edition, 
Walras conceptualises the process of tâtonnement within the context of a pledges model 
that rules out disequilibrium production by definition.  It may take time for all market 
participants to arrive at a structure of pledges that is consistent with equilibrium prices.  
However, as soon as this is achieved, all production and all exchange then takes place 
instantaneously at equilibrium prices.39
 
 
Walras’s reworking of his own concept of tâtonnement has significant implications for 
the way in which we think about the coordination of economic activity.  His original 
understanding, in which disequilibrium trading takes place as an iterative process, occurs 
across time, as individual market actors grope their way towards equilibrium prices 
through everyday exchange activities.  As such, it is an abstraction designed to capture 
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the history of the equilibrating process.  By contrast, the tâtonnement of the fourth 
edition, in which disequilibrium exchange is defined away, occurs at a single moment of 
time, as all transactions take place simultaneously at equilibrium prices.  If we are 
attentive to Walras’s insistence that we focus on the economy’s price dynamics, then his 
removal of the temporal dimension of price determination in this latter model leaves us, 
somewhat paradoxically, with a tâtonnement without groping.  At most, he provides an 
abstraction designed to capture the mechanism of a single equilibration moment.40
 
 
Walras’s reworked account of the tâtonnement process had an important impact on 
subsequent theoretical developments within economics.  Perhaps most obviously, it 
liberated the study of the coordination problem from Smith’s philosophical concern for 
the motivations of the individual economic agent.  The individual disappears from a 
purely mechanistic interpretation of a single moment of equilibration and, as such, 
questions about the constitution of the individual as a moral agent are rendered entirely 
redundant. 
 
Yet, this does not mean that Walras bypasses the crux of Smith’s analysis of the 
coordination problem simply to take a successful analytical short-cut to its resolution.  
Indeed, from the perspective of the coordination problem, Walras’s reworked concept of 
tâtonnement appears to be self-defeating.  At the very least, it leaves fundamentally 
unexplained that which he set out to explain in the first place.  An equilibrium position is 
assumed in the fourth edition of Les Eléments, but never actually demonstrated.  The 
Walras of edition four takes us no closer than the Walras of the first three editions to 
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understanding the means through which individual economic activity is coordinated in 
line with the existence of equilibrium.  In fact, it could be said that the Walras of edition 
four takes us further away.  Throughout the first three editions of Les Eléments, Walras 
suggests that the resolution of the coordination problem lies somewhere in the process of 
the determination of prices but, by the fourth edition, he has stopped thinking of the 
determination of prices as a process.  It is little wonder, then, that he is unable to tell us 
where, precisely, within the price mechanism that the resolution of the coordination 
problem is to be found. 
 
Walras’s actual accomplishments are much more limited.  He is successful in solving a 
system of simultaneous equations in order to determine, mathematically, what the 
condition of equilibrium would look like were it to arise.  Yet, this is at the expense of 
explaining the dynamic processes that take the economy towards equilibrium.  This 
remains resolutely indeterminate in Walras’s formulation41
 
 and, as such, the coordination 
problem remains resolutely unresolved. 
By edition four of Les Eléments, Walras may even have given up trying to resolve the 
coordination problem as a matter of pure economics.  The changes he makes in the fourth 
edition suggest that he was only attempting to demonstrate how the impersonal 
mechanism of pure competition in a perfect market serves to regulate behaviour in a 
manner that is analogous to formal coordination.  His original aim was transformed until 
it became merely that of specifying the economic equivalent of a solution which, to cite 
the noted Walras scholar, William Jaffé, “only a computer-like intellectus angelicus 
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knowing all the parameters could arrive at algebraically”.42  It was left to others to 
embody such an intellectus angelicus in the form of a fictitious person: the Walrasian 
auctioneer.  It is unclear exactly where the auctioneer metaphor originates, although we 
can be clear, following Donald Walker, that the construction is not Walras’s own.43  
Perhaps the best that we can do is to follow the suggestion in Franklin Fisher’s 
contribution to The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, in which he attributes the 
auctioneer metaphor to lectures delivered by Schumpeter, with Samuelson subsequently 
bringing it into the written literature.44
 
 
For current purposes, though, the origins of the metaphor are of secondary importance.  
What is more significant is that the real-time interpretation of the tâtonnement process 
founders on the introduction of the clearly mythical auctioneer.45  The auctioneer can 
have no real-world equivalent, as it is an “economy-wide market secretary”,46 who 
presides over a single market that incorporates all known economic activity.  It is 
somehow both internal to the market (insofar as it condenses all information relevant to 
transacting on the market), yet external to it (in the sense that the auctioneer itself is 
disinterested in the distributional effects of market outcomes).  The role of the auctioneer 
is twofold.  First, it carries all market-sensitive information simultaneously to all market 
participants.  Second, it cries out the equilibrium price, at which point production and 
exchange not only become possible, but are actually carried out.47  In the absence of the 
auctioneer crying out the equilibrium price, no production or exchange can occur.  
Therefore, without the auctioneer centrally receiving and disseminating all price 
information, the market economy is a logical impossibility.48 
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The auctioneer may appear to resolve the coordination problem, insofar as the 
coordination problem is explained away in its presence.  But, by being forced to invoke 
such a construction in order to explain away the problem, Walras is in fact admitting that 
it defeated him.  The tâtonnement process of the first three editions of Les Eléments was 
an attempt to resolve the coordination problem at the level of pure economics.  Walras’s 
original intention was to show how individual actions, some situated on the demand-side 
of the economy and some on the supply-side, created effects that were the functional 
equivalent of a market machine grinding out equilibrium prices.49
 
  However, by allowing 
something akin to an auctioneer to set equilibrium prices beyond the scope of individual 
activities, Walras stipulates no pure economic mechanism for resolving the coordination 
problem in the fourth edition of Les Eléments. 
 
 
 
 
Solving the Coordination Problem through Mathematics: The Shaky Foundations of 
Market Economics? 
 
Many important implications follow from Walras’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to 
show that coordination is possible in the context of an in-time model in which 
disequilibrium trading is permitted.  It is his inability to demonstrate that the coordination 
 25 
of market activity is an exclusively economic issue that leads to his revisions between the 
first three and the fourth editions of Les Eléments and, in particular, to the introduction of 
the mechanism which others have understood as the auctioneer.  As Frank Hahn notes in 
a revealing overview of the Walrasian tradition, without the auctioneer, “we are faced 
with the necessity of specifying precisely the forces which shape the producers’ demand 
for goods, and in particular how this demand reacts to [price] signs”.50
 
  However, this is 
the economics of the coordination problem.  The introduction of the auctioneer to explain 
market outcomes serves the rather paradoxical purpose of crowding out the economic 
explanation of the derivation of market activity. 
The auctioneer metaphor is not an explanation couched at the level of pure economics.  
Rather, it is a means of sidestepping the need to detail the economic dynamics through 
which activities are coordinated in decentralised markets.  To add the auctioneer to a 
theoretical model of the economy is to remove the economics from the model.  We must 
be clear that the auctioneer metaphor is an attempt to paper over the cracks in Walras’s 
system.  As Michel De Vroey argues, it is no longer a matter of dispute that “Walras 
failed to provide an explicit complete account of the institutional hypothesis underlying 
his mathematical models”.51
 
  Such an assertion is now taken as given among the 
community of Walras scholars.  De Vroey’s ‘institutional hypothesis’ relates to the 
factors that underpin supply and demand within market economies, so it is here that the 
economics of the coordination problem are to be found.  But it is exactly this that is lost 
in a purely mathematical exposition of the coordination problem. 
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This in itself is no reason to dismiss Walras’s conclusions.  Nor is it reason to dismiss the 
significance of his study.  However, it does make it necessary to think carefully about 
how we interpret his economics.  It is not merely the case that Walras’s economics fails 
to solve the coordination problem.  It could be that he shows the coordination problem to 
be irresolvable as a matter of pure economics.  At the very least, the only solution he is 
capable of offering is a mathematical solution. 
 
For Walras, the line of reasoning is as follows: equilibrium and, along with equilibrium, 
the solution to the coordination problem, is first established “in principle”; then, and only 
then, can it be established “in effect”.52
 
  The fact that equilibrium can be established in 
principle is not sufficient for establishing it in effect, but unless the former condition can 
be satisfied it is certain that the latter cannot.  Walras’s system of simultaneous equations 
– indeed, the whole of his mathematical exposition in the fourth edition – is designed 
only to prove that equilibrium is a logical possibility.  It does not prove that it is an actual 
state of the world. 
The presumption amongst most Walras scholars is that his revisions in the fourth edition 
are an acknowledgement on his part that it is impossible to demonstrate equilibrium in 
effect.  As a consequence, he gave up on this goal in order to concentrate solely on 
delivering a logical proof that equilibrium could exist in principle.  He goes to great 
lengths in the preface to the fourth edition to draw his readers’ attention to the purely 
hypothetical nature of his system: he calls it “this fiction”.53  Walras exorcises 
disequilibrium transactions and production from his analytical framework, so that his 
 27 
mathematical equations can maintain not only their purity, but their very validity.54  As 
Manuel Luís Costa suggests, Walras finally came to the conclusion that he had no choice 
but to understand tâtonnement “as pertaining to the mathematical demonstration of 
general equilibrium.  What he eventually obtained was an algorithmic or iterative 
solution to the problem solved by the system of equations”.55
 
  Put simply, the economic 
‘results’ are contained in the founding assumptions of how the system behaves.  While 
this is fine as a study of pure logic, it provides no knowledge of the economic dynamics 
that lead decentralised markets to equilibrium. 
Moreover, to the extent that this is true of Walras’s own work, it is also true of the 
Walrasian tradition as a whole.  Mathematical developments in general equilibrium 
economics have tended to concentrate on solving the logical puzzles that the 
mathematical economists have themselves created.56  No new knowledge of the workings 
of actual economies can therefore be inferred.  The Walrasian tradition has been more 
successful in asking new questions to which its mathematical models have a ready-made 
answer, than it has been in providing new answers to the enduring questions of political 
economy.57  The most fundamental of these questions, that relating to the coordination 
problem, is no exception.  So long as coordination takes place across disequilibrium 
transactions as well as equilibrium transactions, the Walrasian tradition has nothing to 
say.  Any recognition of the existence of disequilibrium trading corrupts the clarity and 
the precision of the mathematical exposition.58
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What we are left with, then, is a market model that is able to elucidate a mathematical 
system, rather than a mathematical model that is able to explain the market system.59  
The explanation contained within the fourth edition of Les Eléments relates to Walras’s 
simultaneous equations rather than to the institutional basis of the economy.60  However, 
in solving those equations, while Walras might not provide us with a specification of 
economic dynamics, he does provide us with facts that are relevant to the way in which 
we understand the economy.  Walras’s mathematics shows the ever more restrictive 
assumptions that have to be made before equilibrium can be demonstrated, even in 
principle.  Such restrictions become even more exacting before it is possible to fulfil the 
subsequent task, that of demonstrating equilibrium in effect.  These are also the outcomes 
to emerge from modern general equilibrium analysis.  Here, the results tend to be almost 
wholly negative, in that the analysis proves that the result of general equilibrium is 
merely a reflection of the highly unrealistic assumptions on which the analysis is based.  
General equilibrium, which corresponds to the full realisation of the resolution of the 
coordination problem, is patently not a generic feature of the world.61
 
 
Walras’s economics may fail in its own terms.  Yet, he does provide important guidelines 
against which to judge whether the introduction of market institutions will lead to 
coordinated economic activities set within the context of justice in inter-personal 
relations.  Walras shows that there is no reason, rooted solely at the level of pure 
economics, to suggest that this will ever be the outcome of the operation of real 
economies.  In other words, there is no strictly economic justification for the introduction 
of market institutions. 
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In no way does Walras’s elaborate mathematical exposition prove the superiority of 
market economies: not as a matter of mathematics, nor as a matter of logic, and certainly 
not as a matter of economics.  It is closer to the truth to say that it has exactly the 
opposite effect.  As Albert Jolink suggests, this may not be entirely surprising, given that 
Walras gave no thought to constructing his general equilibrium models as a crude 
apologism for market capitalism62.  Walras’s economic models are a thought experiment 
only,63
 
 and the thoughts they should elicit are ones that encourage us to be sceptical about 
the introduction of the institutions of the market economy.  This is especially so when the 
rationale for introducing market institutions is given in purely economic terms.  No such 
reading of Walras can be forthcoming if one accepts as the starting point Schumpeter’s 
view of the history of economic thought.  Nonetheless, it is a reading that deserves 
careful consideration. 
To give one example of why this might be so, let us consider the development agenda of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  By distancing ourselves from 
Schumpeter’s Walrasian history of economic thought, and by focusing instead on 
Walras’s failure to resolve the coordination problem as a matter of pure economics, the 
justification for all manner of World Bank and IMF interventions rapidly falls apart.  The 
political conditionalities that accompany development assistance all serve to deepen the 
process of institutionalising the market economy.  IMF stabilisation packages require 
developing countries to overwrite established economic customs in an attempt to create 
the structures of the market economy,64 while World Bank development loans are 
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increasingly oriented towards reconstituting the individual economic agent with market-
based cognition and rationalities.65
 
  But what are we to make of such interventions in 
light of the foregoing analysis? 
The usual critique of existing development programmes is that market institutions cannot 
be expected to function smoothly if they are simply parachuted onto society from above.  
It tends to be assumed that they have to be truly instituted, in the literal sense of being 
established in an organic manner from within society.  The foregoing analysis, however, 
provides us with an additional dimension to the critique.  It suggests that it matters not 
whether market institutions arise in an organic manner from within society.  Even in 
circumstances such as these, the fact that the coordination problem appears to be 
fundamentally irresolvable at the level of pure economics still implies that there is no 
basic economic rationale for the introduction of market institutions. 
 
Another example may help to reinforce this point.  We observe numerous cases around 
the world in which a society consents to the continued reproduction of market life once 
the institutions of the market economy have become firmly incorporated into everyday 
experience.  But this does nothing to alter the more fundamental existential point being 
made here.  It matters not whether popular consent is forthcoming for the reproduction of 
market institutions, not even if consent is given specifically on the grounds that market 
societies deliver enhanced levels of economic dynamism and material well-being.  Even 
in circumstances such as these, there would have been no basic economic rationale for 
the introduction of market institutions in the first place. 
 31 
 
This conclusion reaches to the very core of what it means to theorise the market 
economy.  Moreover, it is likely to be somewhat troubling for those whose theories of the 
market economy are situated at the level of pure economics.  If we admit the possibility 
that there is no basic economic rationale for the introduction of market institutions, then 
economic theories will be unable to offer more than superficial insights on the one 
subject where we would assume that economists have plausible claims to specialist 
knowledge: how markets work. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis contained in the previous sections suggests that the key questions of 
political economy may be unanswerable if we restrict our search for answers to the 
theories and methods of economics.  The constitutive problem of political economy is 
contained within the question, ‘what makes a market economy?’.  Most of the seemingly 
successful attempts to offer purely economic answers to this question have followed the 
Walrasian tradition of general equilibrium analysis.  Yet, if I am in any way correct in 
this article, these have to be seen as largely Pyrrhic victories.  For a start, the general 
equilibrium approach presents its theories of the market economy in mathematical, rather 
than economic, terms.  Indeed, it has tended to empty theories of the market economy of 
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any economic explanation whatsoever.  The apparent success in resolving the 
coordination problem in fact relates to the ever more restrictive economic assumptions 
that have to be made if theories of the market economy are to retain their internal 
coherence. 
 
The conclusions to be drawn from the general equilibrium approach are, in almost all 
instances, negative.  They show that pure economic theories of the market are largely 
devoid of useful economic content, except for demonstrating the counterfactual that there 
is no strictly economic justification for the introduction of market institutions into 
everyday economic life.  The theory of the market remains ill-formed and under-
determined at the level of pure economics.66
 
 
This brings us right back to the beginning of modern political economy, to the crucial 
question of how economic analysis should proceed.  In particular, I suggest, it returns us 
to the need to reclaim Adam Smith’s intellectual legacy from Schumpeter’s attempt to 
rewrite the history of economic thought from a distinctively Walrasian perspective.  
Smith tries every bit as hard as Walras to stipulate the conditions under which a market 
economy of autonomous individuals can function smoothly in the absence of a central 
authority to coordinate economic activity.  Significantly, however, his views on this issue 
are settled prior to writing The Wealth of Nations, the book that is generally understood to 
be the progenitor of pure economics.  Smith therefore suggests that the coordination 
problem has to be resolved before pure economic analysis can begin.  His attempts at 
such a resolution are focused at the level of moral philosophy. 
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To ask the question, ‘what makes a market economy?’, is to focus on the constitution of 
the individual economic agent as a moral being and to engage with normative issues 
relating to the structuring of society.  As these core concerns of political economy were 
exorcised in the turn towards pure economics, to ask the question, ‘what makes a market 
economy?’, is patently not the precursor for documenting the successes of pure 
economics.  Rather, it serves only to highlight the mistaken nature of attempts to 
formalise the pioneering economics of Adam Smith by subjecting it to the rigours of 
mathematical logic.  If our aim is to explain how markets work, then the history of pure 
economics is one of an extended detour.  We have come a long way to reach the point at 
which it is necessary to argue once again for going back to the beginning and 
rediscovering a form of economic analysis that reunites political economy and moral 
philosophy. 
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